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I. INTRODUCTION
John Hagler, facing prosecution in Palm Beach County in
1983 for possession and sale of cocaine, threatened to make public
at his trial photographs that he said would compromise the State
Attorney. Shortly thereafter, the defense and the prosecution con-
ducted a secret deposition of the State Attorney, without providing
notice. What transpired during the deposition is unknown, but
subsequently Hagler pleaded guilty to a lesser offense in a bargain
with the State Attorney's office, and the court placed him on three
years probation. The contents of the photographs and whether
those contents motivated the prosecution to acquiesce to the plea
bargain, may never be known.'
In Florida, an overwhelming percentage of criminal cases and
a substantial percentage of civil cases terminate before trial. Myr-
iad factors that develop through discovery contribute heavily to
early dispositions, but the process of discovery, and particularly
the taking of depositions, occurs in a twilight zone where neither
the judge nor the public sees all. In the name of justice, the State
strikes quiet deals of infinite variety-some proper, some not. The
1. State v. Hagler, No. 82-3750-CF-A02 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Sept. 12, 1983) (order deny-
ing motion to release deposition transcript). The movant has appealed the denial. See filings
by the parties in Miami Herald & Palm Beach Newspapers v. Hagler & State, No. 83-2062
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983). See generally Plea Deal Arranges Guilty Plea, Rumored Photos Re-
main Hidden, W. Palm Beach Evening Times, Dec. 6, 1983, at CI, col. 6 (discussing possible
contents of photos and the role they played in securing a plea bargain).
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State makes these deals outside the formal arena where the public
could judge for itself whether justice has been done. As in the
Palm Beach County illustration, substantial public interest issues
can be present in early terminations.
A surprising number of trial courts in Florida have drawn
back the veil on depositions so the public can see and hear. Al-
though the Supreme Court of Florida has never addressed the is-
sue of nonparty access to the taking of depositions, or to unfiled
and untranscribed depositions, the issue now appears ripe for con-
sideration. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis,2 which affirmed
a presumption of public and media access to pretrial suppression
hearings, is apparently the latest in an evolving series of common
law cases in which Florida's highest court has found that closer
public scrutiny of the judicial process, in areas until now con-
cealed, is compatible with the requirements of a fair trial. This
Comment will conclude that the court should firmly establish a
presumption of nonparty access to depositions, subject only to the
satisfaction of a closure test similar to the one outlined in Lewis.
A. A Tradition of Open Government in Florida
For more than two decades Florida's government has been a
pacesetter among the states in opening its governmental and polit-
ical processes to public examination. The Florida Constitution, as
a result of the popularly-known "Sunshine Amendment," affords
important status to disclosure of financial interests by public of-
ficers and employees and of campaign finances by candidates. 3 Im-
plementing legislation has made filing of financial reports
mandatory for a wide range of state, county, and municipal officers
and employees.4 The campaign finance requirements were first en-
acted in 1961 under a "who-gave-it-who-got-it" catchword. The
public records law contains limited exceptions but is otherwise un-
equivocal: "It is the policy of this state that all state, county, and
municipal records shall at all times be open for a personal inspec-
tion by any person."6 State law requires public bodies at all levels
2. 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982).
3. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8.
4. See generally FLA. STAT. § 112.311-.326 (1983). Required information includes non-
governmental income, location of real property owned directly or indirectly, sources of gifts
exceeding $100 in value, outstanding debts, and clients represented for a fee before govern-
ment agencies.
5. See generally FLA. STAT. § 106.011-.29 (1983).
6. FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1983).
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to conduct their official business in "public meetings open to the
public at all times."7
Each disclosure requirement has upset cherished habits, tradi-
tions, and notions of privacy. Anguished outcries greeted the pros-
pect of having to reveal personal financial data. Many elected offi-
cials argued, and some still argue, that the public's business cannot
be conducted effectively without some private discussion among
decisionmakers. State agencies and offices, long accustomed to pro-
prietorship over public documents, conjured up justifications for
closing their files to prying citizens and taxpayers. Nevertheless,
high degrees of disclosure and openness of the public's business,
although not universally popular, are now firmly established in
Florida. Political efforts to reverse this policy have been unsuccess-
ful. As a result, there now exists in the body politic an expectation
of open government.
The Supreme Court of Florida has contributed substantially
to the shedding of veils and curtains. In State ex rel. Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh,' the court articulated a judicial
7. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1983). Governmental activities held to be public in nature
and open to public participation include the following: parole revocation meetings, Wain-
wright v. Turner, 389 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1980); grievance arbitration hearing involving school
teacher, Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. School Bd., 411 So. 2d 1375 (Fla.
4th DCA 1982); handwritten notes compiled by psychological consulting firm during appli-
cant interview, Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360
So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978);*police complaint review board, 1978 FLA. Arr'v GEN. ANN.
REP. 260 ( No. 078-105); board of visitors for juvenile detention home, 1977 FLA. Arr'v GEN.
ANN. REP. 298 (No. 077-137); initiation of investigation of certificate holder by board of
accountancy, 1976 FLA. Arr'v GEN. ANN. REP. 489 (No. 076-225); conciliation conferences
conducted by city's human relations board, 1974 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP, 592 (No. 074-
358). In Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974), the Supreme Court of
Florida explained:
One purpose of the government in the sunshine law was to prevent at non-
public meetings the crystallization of secret decisions to a point just short of
ceremonial acceptance. Rarely could there be any purpose to a nonpublic pre-
meeting conference except to conduct some part of the decisional process behind
closed doors. The statute should be construed so as to frustrate all evasive
devices.
The principle to be followed is very simple: When in doubt, the members of
any board, agency, authority or commission should follow the open-meeting pol-
icy of the State.
Id. at 477. The Sunshine Law itself does not apply to the judiciary because of the separation
of powers doctrine. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2 (empowering the judicial branch to adopt
rules governing practice and procedure in the courts); FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (prohibiting
the legislative branch from exercising judicial powers). But the policy undergirding that law
has its roots in the common law and those precepts should apply as strongly to pretrial
proceedings as to premeeting proceedings of executive bodies.
8. 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1976) (quashing trial court order restraining pretrial publication
in securities fraud case because order imposed prior restraint on constitutionally privileged
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policy of maximum feasible openness, rooted largely, according to
the court, in common law and common sense.' Although a trial
court is legitimately concerned with preventing prejudicial public-
ity from poisoning the impartial atmosphere essential to a fair
trial, "the court's action in restricting the media must relate to the
danger sought to be avoided and it must not be unconstitutionally
overbroad."' 10 The McIntosh court stated:
A member of the press . . . may be properly considered as a
representative of the public insofar as enforcement of public
right of access to the court is concerned; and the public and
press have a fundamental right of access to all judicial proceed-
ings. . . . [T]here is no special perquisite of the judiciary which
enables it to suppress, edit or censor events which transpire in
proceedings before it . . ..
Freedom of the press, said the unanimous McIntosh court, is an
almost sacred right of each citizen to be informed about current
events on a timely basis: "News delayed is news denied. To be use-
ful to the public, news events must be reported when they occur.
Whatever happens in any courtroom directly or indirectly affects
all the public. To prevent star-chamber injustice the public should
generally have unrestricted access to all proceedings. ''12
In 1979 the Supreme Court of Florida gave a quantum rein-
forcement to that policy by issuing a permanent order"3 opening all
state courtrooms to photographic and aural coverage by news me-
dia under carefully constructed guidelines. 4 After concluding that
gavel-to-gavel television coverage of the Florida Legislature had
enhanced rather than degraded the legislative process, 5 the court
applied the rationale to itself:
The court system is no less an institution of democratic gov-
ernment in our society. Because of the courts' dispute resolution
and decision-making role, its judgments and decrees have an
equally significant effect on the day-to-day lives of the citizenry
publications or communication).
9. Id. at 910.
10. Id. at 908 (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 908-09.
12. Id. at 910.
13. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979). The order was
based on a petition for access filed in 1975, and was preceded by a one-year experimental
access period for media followed by a one-year moratorium while the court assessed the
experiment and weighed the issues. Id. at 766.
14. Id. at 783-85.
15. Id. at 780.
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as the other branches of the government. It is essential that the
populace have confidence in the process, for public acceptance
of judicial judgments and decisions is manifestly necessary to
their observance ...
Regrettably, public knowledge and understanding of the ju-
dicial process is at a low ebb .
The advent in 1977 of a one-year experiment with camera access
spawned strong protest from the organized bar in Florida, as well
as from many judges.'7 Today, photographic coverage of judicial
proceedings is an everyday occurrence, especially in Florida's pop-
ulation centers. Except for scattered opposition by attorneys, there
is no movement to reverse the reform.18
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis 9 emerged in 1982 from
the soil thus cultivated. The Supreme Court of Florida announced
a "non-constitutional privilege"20 of the press, as a public surro-
gate, to attend a pretrial suppression hearing. Citing its own and
other opinions, the court restated the virtues of openness: promo-
tion of free discussion of governmental affairs, a check on corrupt
practices in the judicial process, and protection of the rights of the
accused to a fair trial.2 ' "Finally, because participating lawyers,
witnesses and judges know their conduct will be subject to public
scrutiny, it is fair to conclude that they will be more conscientious
in the performance of their roles. '2 2 Pretrial hearings now enjoy a
presumption of openness" and may be closed to the public only
upon the satisfaction of a three-pronged test.24
The casting of more and more light on judicial business by the
Supreme Court of Florida has hardly occurred in a vacuum. Al-
though they are beyond the scope of this inquiry, the doctrinal and
philosophical precepts involved reach far back into history.2 The
16. Id. at 780-81.
17. A challenge to the camera-access ruling was carried to the Supreme Court of the
United States in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). The Court held that the presence
of a camera in a courtroom is not per se a violation of a defendant's fair trial rights.
18. Even before the court's permanent order in 1979, Florida became the model for
allowing camera access to proceedings. Other states duplicated the Florida experiment. To-
day, more than three dozen states have temporary or permanent rules permitting photo-
graphic coverage.
19. 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982).
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 6-7.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. For specific applications of doctrine and policy, and for references to their historical
1984]
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significance of the public's right to know has ancient roots, but em-
phasis on that right in recent years has no parallel in the nation's
history. This emphasis reflects a population more broadly educated
and informed, heightened sensitivities about the relationship of in-
dividuals to government, a healthy distrust of governmental pow-
ers, and a demonstrated capacity of big government (along with
other institutions) to abuse its powers with unprecedented impact.
The public's surveillance operates through a sophisticated moni-
toring apparatus-media and other observers-never known before
in the society.
B. Pretrial Resolutions in the Shadows
"One must doubt," wrote Justice Powell, "whether empirical
evidence would demonstrate that untrammeled discovery actually
contributes to the just resolution of disputes. ' 26 Professor Wright
has called discovery "the Cinderella of the changes in procedure
made by the Civil Rules. Now [some] are saying that the carriage
has turned into a pumpkin, and that major changes are needed if it
is to be a carriage again. ' 27 It is widely believed that discovery is
being abused and is exacerbating delays and costs.
Whatever the merits of the discovery controversy, another re-
ality about discovery that is generally unexplored is that it takes
place in a semiprivate environment largely beyond the gaze of the
public, and typically beyond the scrutiny of a judge.2 The role of
discovery may be better assessed if the pretrial universe within
which discovery operates is correctly perceived.
In the years 1979, 1980, and 1981, Florida's circuit courts dis-
posed of a total of 326,433 criminal matters; 313,598 or 96.1% were
terminated before trial. Resolutions of civil matters in those courts
during the same period totalled 584,540, of which 25% or 147,168
were terminated before hearing. Some civil cases had a much
higher pretrial termination rate: negligence, 51.4%; medical mal-
practice, 53%.29
origins, see generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
26. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
27. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 539 (4th ed. 1983).
28. This Comment focuses on depositions; its rationale, however, applies generally to
other discovery methods as well.
29. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, FLORIDA JUDICIAL SYSTEM STATISTICAL
AND PROGRAM ACTIVITY REPORTS (1979-81). The actual ratio of state civil cases terminated at
an early stage is likely to be higher. The State employed unnecessarily vague terminology in
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Many factors account for early resolutions, which are often
said to mark an efficient use of judicial resources. It is widely as-
sumed that the settlement of disputes among litigants outside the
formal environment of the courtroom are less costly, less trau-
matic, and less time-consuming, yet the contrary may be true on
all counts. What does or does not happen in that shadowy pretrial
arena can have significant implications for the society in which the
disputes arise. The volume of early terminations troubles Judge
Kaufman of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
Many judges view this high proportion of settlements as a neces-
sary and desirable safety valve without which the courts would
founder. I perceive such an extraordinarily high percentage of
settlements, however, as an index of injustice that reflects the
... twin demons that plague our judicial system: cost and
delay.
...[S]ome plaintiffs who have "legal rights" to plenary re-
lief are being coerced by the cost of justice into accepting far
less than their due, while some defendants are yielding to oppor-
tunistic litigants who unabashedly wield the expenses of litiga-
tion as weapons to extort undeserved settlements."0
Judge Bazelon of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia has expressed similar reservations: "Some of our most vital
decisions about guilt and sentence are not made out in the open by
judges and juries, but behind the scenes by. . .lawyers . .. [T]he
two sides meet in secret in a test of nothing more than raw bar-
its tabulations. The termination breakpoint for criminal matters is before "trial," but that
used for civil matters is before "hearing." The latter criterion almost surely promotes some
confusion among tabulators and in the best circumstances leaves doubt about the meaning
of the data, a point agreed to in a telephone conversation on Mar. 20, 1984 by Susan Wilson,
who compiles these statewide summaries for the Administrator's office.
The percentages in federal district courts are more consistent. During a recent one-year
period, criminal matters involving 40,466 defendants were terminated, 34,451 (85%) of
which never reached the trial stage. On the civil dockets, 103,905 cases were resolved, with
92,579 (89.1%) concluded before trial. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 242, 310 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL
REPORT].
Because the two court systems operate under essentially the same rules, motions and
hearings on civil cases occur in essentially the same context. The much higher early-termi-
nation rate in federal courts arguably is closer to the early-termination reality in Florida's
trial courts.
30. Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976). A
federal district judge reached a similar conclusion with more pointed language: "[T]he ad-
versary trial is employed only rarely. Most cases are concluded by the adversaries them-
selves, through the best bargain their competitive skills, their undisclosed secrets, and 'jus-
tice market conditions' can combine to fashion." Frankel, From Private Fights Toward
Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 520 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
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gaining power. ' 's
The forms of pretrial resolution vary. On the criminal side, the
court may dismiss the charges or accept a plea without an exami-
nation on the merits. Infinite considerations can determine either
outcome, and judges usually accept the results recommended by
prosecutors after their negotiations with defendants. The plaintiff
can dismiss a civil case voluntarily, or the court can dismiss invol-
untarily. If the defendant is particularly passive, the court may
enter a default. In addition, any party can move for summary
judgment.
Where a settlement is involved, the attorneys can conclude the
final terms in private conversation lasting only a few minutes. The
only "record" that might provide some understanding of the settle-
ment is the tangible and often voluminous accumulation of testi-
mony and information derived through discovery.32 That "record"
often convinces one party or the other that settlement is preferable
to trial.3
31. Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 653, 663 (1971). A federal district judge agrees that in most criminal cases the adver-
saries themselves seek a bargain by applying competitive skills, undisclosed secrets, and
justice market conditions: "The secrets may include a . . . prosecutor's knowledge that a
key witness is missing, defense counsel's inability to collect a fee making a trial worth his
while, defense counsel's fear of trial, relationships between prosecutors and defense lawyers,
and other matters Plato might not have perceived as essentials of justice." Frankel, supra
note 30, at 520 n.20.
32. The District Court Studies Project analyzed 3,000 federal civil cases terminated
during fiscal 1975 and found that discovery requests (considering only those filed with the
court) emerged in about half of the cases, with an average of 1.49 requests in low-usage
cases and 17.47 requests in high-usage cases. The authors recognized that,
not all discovery accomplished by litigating parties would be recorded in court
files . . . ; To assess how reliably recorded discovery events indicate total dis-
covery activity, we conducted a small survey of lawyers who had appeared in the
sample cases. . . . [The survey] revealed that approximately 75 percent of total
discovery activity was regularly filed with the courts.
Connolly, Holleman, & Kuhlman, Judicial Controls and the Civil Litigative Process: Dis-
covery, FED. JUD. CENTER 27, 29 (1978). Many actions taken to court involve such things as
the clarification of rights and the recording of documents and actions. In those cases, as in
others where the disputes are real but narrow and limited, discovery has no utility.
33. "Because of the far reaching effects depositions may have upon the ultimate out-
come of a case (such as their use to obtain a summary judgment under Rule 1.510), great
care should precede their taking:" FLA. STAT. ANN., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310, Authors' Comment,
at 403 (West 1967). One commentator, attempting to demolish the "myth" of a public access
approach to discovery, observes that "much of the information collected in preparation for
litigation is gathered through investigation conducted by or for counsel rather than through
formal discovery," and concludes that the work product doctrine generally shields such in-
formation from discovery. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1983). In the absence of judicially-enforced compulsion for
nondiscovery investigations, that method of information gathering almost surely has limited
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Attorneys can take depositions soon after filing a claim or
charge, or even sometimes before. 4 Depositions usually take place
extrajudicially, beyond the direct supervision of a judge but under
his ultimate control. Barring unusual problems or needs of the par-
ties, such as a request for a protective order, a judge may not see
the fruits of discovery until the trial, and often not even then.
The tradition of public proceedings in an open court thus has
limited application in the majority of disputes that are sufficiently
serious to warrant the filing of a claim or charge. When causes are
terminated and the underlying basis for the termination remains
unknown, justice operates in the shadows. This is especially so
when the government is a party, always the case in criminal ac-
tions, and often the case in civil disputes. 5 It is also potentially
true in many actions between private parties, depending on the na-
ture of the dispute, the status of the parties, and the relationships
of the parties with others.
In criminal actions, especially where the power of the state can
be employed irresponsibly or corruptly to abridge such fundamen-
tal rights as life, liberty, and property, the public has a special in-
terest in the early disposition of cases. The status of crime as a
social and political issue of great magnitude, and the widespread
distrust and even cynicism about the effectiveness of the criminal
justice process, are powerful arguments for laying bare the basis on
which criminal cases are "settled" before trial. In civil actions,
seemingly innocuous contract, tort, or property disputes may have
wider implications if, for instance, one or more of the disputants is
a public figure, if the dispute has political overtones, or if there is
an impact on public land or programs. Where the public interest
effectiveness in most cases. The pervasive use of discovery by litigants speaks for itself.
Furthermore, only in rare circumstances can such investigations match the results obtaina-
ble in depositions. Beyond Marcus' contention is the possibility that litigants, confronted
with a general presumption of public access to depositions, will simply agree not to conduct
them and instead to exchange information informally through affidavits or other devices.
Parties make similar value judgments frequently, of course, in developing strategy for litiga-
tion. Affidavits and other statements, as building blocks for a trial or hearing, lack the com-
prehensive qualities embodied in depositions that are taken under oath, with cross-examina-
tion, before an official court reporter, with answers compelled unless the court decrees
otherwise.
34. To perpetuate testimony that might otherwise be lost, a petitioner can seek court
approval before an action is commenced. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.290(a). Otherwise, depositions can
begin 30 days after a filing or sooner with leave of court. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(a).
35. In a recent year, for example, the United States was a plaintiff in 68,368 cases
among 185,507 civil cases filed, and was a defendant in many other federal question filings.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 242.
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may be involved, parties should not settle disputes in semiprivacy.
Conversely, the presence of the public interest may not become ap-
parent unless the discovery process is open to public scrutiny.
Representation by counsel at the taking of depositions, or the
fact that an official record is always made, does not sufficiently
protect the public's right to know. A party may prepare and file a
transcript late or not at all.-6 Parties and counsel may or may not
conduct themselves fairly. Because the rules of evidence do not ap-
ply at this stage, all manner of materials, information, and argu-
ment that may seem to be highly relevant, probative, and admissi-
ble for the forthcoming trial will confront parties and witnesses. 7
The protection of the trial rules provide no assistance when a
party is under pressure during discovery and is attempting to de-
cide whether to proceed to trial. As a result, the procedure may
overwhelm the merits. Whether it does cannot be known if the
courts shield depositions and other discovery procedures from the
public's view.
The Supreme Court of the United States has emphasized re-
peatedly the public's right to know about the actual conduct of
government and has included the judiciary within the definition of
that term.38 Pretrial terminations have become a crucial aspect of
government.3 9 The Court has asserted that "an arbitrary interfer-
ence with access [by citizens] to important information" concern-
36. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(f).
37. "All objections made [in an oral deposition] ... to the manner of taking it, or
to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party and any other objec-
tion to the proceedings shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evi-
dence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections."
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(c).
38. See generally infra text accompanying notes 83-85.
39. In 1928, Raymond Moley complained that an agency other than the jury disposed
of 96% of the felony cases in one year in Cook County, Illinois.
[W]hile it is true that from the standpoint of public interest the cases which
reach a jury are often striking and well known, their actual importance as a
group is overshadowed by the great mass of cases which is disposed of by the
prosecutor, the preliminary magistrate and the judge acting without a jury ...
It is . . . as truly a process of administration as is such governmental routine as
the collection of taxes, the conservation of public health, the building of public
works or the management of police departments.
Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928). Two researchers traced the disposi-
tion of cases in two California counties over an 80-year period and found that "the incidence
of trials has substantially declined between 1890 and 1970. . . . In 1890, more than one out
of every three cases filed in Alameda County was brought to trial. Today less than one in six
has such a life cycle. . . . [I]n San Benito . . . trial incidence fell from one in four in 1890,
to only one of nine today. . . ." Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in
Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'y REV. 267, 287 (1976).
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ing government is constitutionally wrong.40 Unfortunately, the
traditional arguments concerning closure of depositions tend to-
ward an outright prohibition on access and are thus flawed by their
absolutism.
A recent Florida appellate opinion illustrates the absolutism
rationale. In Tallahassee Democrat Inc. v. Willis41 the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal said that "depositions very often contain
matters that are not and can never be considered as evidence,"
that nonparties are "often compelled under process of law to di-
vulge information," and that the taking of a deposition cannot be
categorized as a judicial proceeding "for the simple reason that
there is no judge present" and no judicial rulings or adjudications
are made. 42 Florida trial courts often cite Willis when denying ac-
cess to depositions.
The Florida Rules of Judicial Administration prescribe proce-
dures for the conduct of depositions by trial courts. The language
"judicial proceedings, including depositions" appears in two
places .4 The rules define "court records" to include depositions in
the custody of the clerk as well as electronic, video, and steno-
graphic tapes of depositions not filed with the clerk."
In contrast, the trial court in Florida v. Sanchez45 provided a
view of depositions that differs sharply with the Willis court's
definition:
The Court is fully satisfied that depositions are judicial proceed-
ings. Depositions are proceedings governed by court rules....
Testimony given at deposition is under oath and is binding.
Lawyers present at deposition are acting as officers of the court.
The prosecutor is, of course, acting in his official capacity. A
court reporter transcribes the testimony.46
Whether the taking of depositions is part of "judicial procedure"
may ultimately be unimportant. While theoreticians debate the
point, depositions and other discovery devices continue to contrib-
ute substantially to pretrial terminations, which are widely per-
40. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Burger, C.J., for the
plurality).
41. 370 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
42. Id. at 872 n.4; see also Times Newspapers Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F.
Supp. 189, 194-97 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (an extensive discussion of similar reasons for the sealing
of depositions).
43. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.070(c), (f).
44. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.075(a)(1).
45. State v. Sanchez, 1 Fla. Supp. 2d 116 (15th Cir. Ct. 1981).
46. Id. at 120.
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ceived in the community to be part of the judicial process. The
tests of integrity that courts apply to the trial environment need to
be applied to other parts of the judicial process where much "jus-
tice" occurs.
The Supreme Court of Florida in McIntosh largely refuted the
argument that opening depositions to the public may result in
prejudicial publicity. In Lewis, the court noted that "[tlhe inherent
conflict between these two [fundamental] rights is a difficult one to
resolve, and in so doing, we seek a solution that gives maximum
importance to both interests. '4 7 The Lewis court then installed a
three-pronged test for those seeking denial of public access.48
It is often contended that the law compels witnesses to divulge
all manner of information during depositions that may not eventu-
ally be used at trial and that as a result a right of privacy should
prevail. The Supreme Court of the United States confronted that
issue recently in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,49 in the
context of voir dire examination of prospective jurors.
[H]ow we allocate the "right" to openness as between the ac-
cused and the public, or whether we view it as a component in-
herent in the system benefitting both, is not crucial. No right
ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial. But the
primacy of the accused's right is difficult to separate from the
right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which
promotes fairness. 50
According to the Court, the compelling privacy interest of a pro-
spective juror may arise when the interrogation touches on deeply
personal matters, but "[t]he presumption of openness may be over-
come only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. '51
II. A LEGAL BASIS FOR ACCESS
No court of last resort in any jurisdiction has yet embraced a
presumption of the public access for depositions and other ele-
ments of discovery, although many of those courts52 have opened
47. Lewis, 426 So. 2d at 3.
48. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
49. 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
50. Id. at 823.
51. Id. at 824.
52. See infra note 90.
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the door to other pretrial procedures as a plausible, legal extension
of a philosophy of open government. Many lower courts, particu-
larly in Florida and in federal jurisdictions, have laid a predicate
for a qualified right of access to pretrial depositions. In a recent
case arising in Washington state, discussed below, the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed the question, albeit incom-
pletely. The Supreme Court of Florida is likely to confront the
matter soon in view of burgeoning litigation in lower courts and
conflicting rulings by trial judges. At least three legal theories sup-
port a presumption of nonparty access: the first amendment, com-
mon law, and rules of procedure.
A. First Amendment
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States
through several important decisions has steadily enlarged the con-
stitutional basis for public access to the judicial process. The first
amendment is seen not only as prohibiting governmental restraints
on speech and ideas, but also as affirmatively prying open the
many doors of government for public examination. In Richmond
Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia,53 Justice Brennan depicted that ex-
panding view in his ratification of the idea of public trials: "While
these decisions are impelled by the classic protections afforded by
the First Amendment to pure communication, they are also bot-
tomed upon a keen appreciation of the structural interest served in
opening the judicial system to public inspection. ' 54 The public
scrutiny, he said, emphasizes "a major purpose"55 of the first
amendment: promotion of the discussion of governmental affairs.
Justice Stevens, concurring in Richmond Newspaper, reiterated
the theme: "[Flor the first time," he wrote, "the Court unequivo-
cally holds that an arbitrary interference with access [by citizens]
to important information is an abridgement of the freedoms of
speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment.""6
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, said that the first
amendment freedoms to speak, publish, and petition the govern-
ment "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of com-
munication on matters relating to the functioning of
government."57
53. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
54. Id. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 575.
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Building on Richmond Newspapers, the Court stressed in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court58 that while the right of
access to criminal trials is not absolute it is "of constitutional stat-
ure." '' As compelling as the state's interest is in safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor during testimony,
"it does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the
circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of
the interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis
whether closure is necessary . . . ."' In Board of Education v.
Pico," the Court again emphasized the constitutional right to re-
ceive information and ideas: "This right is an inherent corollary of
the rights .of free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution . . . [T]he right to receive ideas is a necessary
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights
of speech, press, and political freedom."62
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,63 the Court stated
that privacy interests were not sufficient to warrant prolonged clo-
sure: "[T]he trial court's orders denying access to voir dire testi-
mony failed to consider whether alternatives were available to pro-
tect the interests of the prospective jurors that the trial court's
orders sought to guard. Absent consideration of alternatives to clo-
sure, the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir
dire."64
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has extended the access
doctrine to pretrial records and files. In Associated Press v. United
States District Court,65 the court found "no reason to distinguish
between pretrial proceedings and the documents filed in regard to
58. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
59. Id. at 606.
60. Id. at 607-08.
61. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (limiting school board authority to remove books from school
library).
62. Id. at 869.
63. 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
64. Id. at 825. The Court relied heavily on Richmond Newspapers and Globe to reach
its result. It also quoted liberally from an account of jury selection written in 1565:
All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the Judges, the Justices, the
enquest, the prisoner, and so many as will or can come so neare as to heare it,
and all depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may heare from the
mouth of the depositors and witnesses what is saide.
Id. at 822-23 (emphasis supplied by Court) (quoting T. SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 101
(Alston ed. 1906)).
65. 705 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit had previously held that the first
amendment right of access to criminal trials also applies to pretrial proceedings such as
suppression hearings. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1982).
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them. Indeed, the . . . principal justifications for the first amend-
ment right of access to criminal proceedings apply, in general, to
pretrial documents.""6
Moreover, pretrial documents, such as those dealing with the
question whether [defendant] DeLorean should be incarcerated
prior to trial and those containing allegations by DeLorean of
government misconduct, are often important to a full under-
standing of the way in which "the judicial process and the gov-
ernment as a whole" are functioning. We thus find that the pub-
lic and press have a first amendment right of access to pretrial
documents in general.67
A recent Supreme Court case, involving a litigant's public dis-
semination of discovery materials, produced an anomalous result in
view of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Richmond News-
papers, Globe Newspaper, Pico, and Press-Enterprise. In Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart,5 the Court concluded that "[a] litigant
has no First Amendment right of access to information made avail-
able only for purposes of trying his suit."69 The Court held that a
protective order denying publication of the information was appro-
priate because "[t]he trial court is in the best position to weigh
fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by
discovery.""0
Rhinehart, however, was factually narrow and stated no broad
principle. The Court employed some sweeping language despite the
fact that the appeal did not deal with the access issue and the jus-
tices were therefore not fully briefed on that issue. 71 In addition,
the opinion is apparently limited to civil actions, 7 12 and the holding
66. 705 F.2d at 1145.
67. Id.
68. 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984).
69. Id. at 2207.
70. Id. at 2209 (footnote omitted).
71. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199
(1984). The Court, noting that depositions and interrogatories were not open to the public
at common law, cited Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389 (1979), where the Court
had observed that "[u]nder English common law, the public had no right to attend pretrial
proceedings .... [Tihe principle of publicity only applies to the actual trial of a case
.... Reliance on such authority strangely overlooks the important opinions since Gannett
(which has been largely discredited by commentators and to some extent by the Court it-
self) in which the Court has enlarged publicity beyond the trials themselves. See supra
p.169 (textual discussion of first amendment).
72. "[P]retrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil
trial." Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2207 (footnote omitted).
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arguably prescribes no outright ban on dissemination. 3 Instead,
the opinion supported the Washington legislature's power to allow
judges to grant protective orders in discovery.74 Nevertheless, the
Court conceded that a reduced first amendment right was in-
volved: "In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to dissemi-
nate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First
Amendment rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent
than would restraints on dissemination of information in a differ-
ent context.
'71
The Court said that protective orders might be essential in
some cases because "discovery . . .may seriously implicate privacy
interests of litigants and third parties. ' 76 Such a finding is broadly
consistent with the Court's opinion in Press-Enterprise, in which
the Court instructed trial judges to engage in similar weighing of
interests.7 In Rhinehart, the Court noted that pretrial discovery
was dangerous because it "has a significant potential for abuse. "78
Ironically, the opinions in Rhinehart and other opinions have left
completely unexamined the significant potential for abuse in the
wholesale pretrial termination of cases, which is totally beyond
public scrutiny and abetted by pretrial discovery. 79 That issue, on
which the Court has not yet heard argument, must await another
case on another day.
B. Common Law
The public's common law right to know is, in one sense, more
broadly based than the right the first amendment provides. For
reasons outlined above, that right has been strongly reinforced by
73. "The Court said that in general depositions ... are conducted in private as a mat-
ter of modern practice." Id. at 2208. (emphasis added); see infra pp.178-80 (discussing dep-
osition-taking as a custom).
74. "As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state legislature, the
processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace." Id. at 2207.
75. Id. at 2208. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
said: "The Court today recognizes that pretrial protective orders, designed to limit the dis-
semination of information gained through the civil discovery process, are subject to scrutiny
under the First Amendment." Id. at 2210 (Brennan & Marshall J.J., concurring).
76. Id. at 2208 (footnote omitted).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
78. Id. at 2208 (footnote omitted).
79. In Rhinehart, as well as in much jurisprudential literature, concern is expressed
regarding the abuses that frequently occur in the discovery process in terms of expense,
delay, and intimidation of individuals. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31. Because
many of these abuses are subtle and not amenable to remedy by a judge through a protec-
tive order, the indiscriminate use of protective orders to foreclose public inspection of the
process would have the effect of helping to perpetuate the abuses.
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legislative and executive, as well as judicial, action within the last
quarter-century. Reviewing half a century of administrative law,
Professor Jerre Williams 0 saw the federal Freedom of Information
Act as part of "a broader recognition and acceptance of the citi-
zen's right to know about what his government is doing, and as a
means of protection against the government unfairly favoring one
citizen over another or one interest group in our society over an-
other. ... [T]his development currently is quite pervading
. . "'I The authors of a leading textbook on the subject believe
that "information respecting the contents of government files is far
more widely available today . . . and . . . the bureaucracy as a
whole is becoming accustomed to the new ethic." 2
The "new ethic" is but an elaborately articulated version of an
old idea: "the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that 'jus-
tice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' "" The United States
Supreme Court restated that earlier theme in Richmond Newspa-
pers, in which the Court held that the closing of a criminal trial to
the public violated the Constitution.
The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice
cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur
if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert manner." . . .
[W]here the trial has been concealed from public view an unex-
pected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has
failed and at worst has been corrupted. . . . [Tihe appearance
of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it. 4
The Court relied on Jeremy Bentham to stress the role of disclos-
ure in democratic societies: "[Ifn comparison of publicity, all other
checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other
institutions might present themselves in the character of checks,
would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks . "8. 5
80. First chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States.
81. Williams, Fifty Years of the Law of the Federal Administration Agencies-and
Beyond, 29 FED. B. J. 267, 276 (1969). The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), adopted in
1967, makes government information available to persons rather than parties. It strongly
favors citizens suits by giving them priority on calendars, limiting the government's time to
answer, and authorizing attorney fees and costs. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(C), (D), (E) (1982).
82. W. GELLHORN, C. BYsE, & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 584 (7th ed. 1979).
83. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoting Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
84. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571-72 (quoting the 1677 Concessions and
Agreements of West New Jersey, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed.
1959)).
85. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (quoting 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDI-
CIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
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In Lewis,s6 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld public access
to a suppression hearing by emphasizing the majority opinion in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale87 which pinned the closure decision on
an assessment of competing societal interests rather than on the
Bill of Rights. The Florida court then proceeded to a common law
based conclusion adopting a three-part closure test that could ade-
quately balance those competing interests, and a presumption of
openness that would serve the overall public interest.
According to the Lewis court public access to the courts "pro-
motes free discussion of governmental affairs by imparting a more
complete understanding to the public of the judicial system.""8
Discovery is an integral part of that system, and cases that disap-
pear from the system with the leverage of discovery, and with little
or no public knowledge of the underlying basis for the resolution,
impair public understanding of the system. The closure test in
Lewis may be extended plausibly to incorporate discovery. The
test has three criteria for closure:
1. [c]losure is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice;
2. [n]o alternatives are available, other than change of venue,
which would protect a defendant's right to a fair trial; and
3. [cllosure would be effective in protecting the rights of the ac-
cused, without being broader than necessary to accomplish this
purpose.89
Appellate courts in many other states have adopted similar
86. 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982).
87. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
88. Lewis, 426 So. 2d at 6 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)).
89. Id. (emphasis added). The portions italicized are the court's principal additions to
an otherwise-similar test adopted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Miami Herald
Pub. Co. v. State, 363 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). That test emerged from princi-
ples cited earlier by the Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. Miami Herald v. McIn-
tosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1976) (prior restraint), which in turn relied on the holding in
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraint). One commentator
insists that busy courts "have little time for such undertakings" as closure tests, particularly
in complex cases where tens of thousands of discovery documents may be involved. Marcus,
supra note 33, at 24. He concedes that the problem is an inherent one in discovery because
federal (and Florida) rules allow parties to seek protective orders, but argues that the good-
cause standard for such orders can be applied by judges more flexibly than closure tests
such as that prescribed in Lewis. Id. at 25. But federal courts in particular have devised
special rules and procedures for coping with complex litigation, including the appointment
of special masters to supervise discovery. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 96
F.R.D. 582 (E.D.N.Y, 1983). Furthermore, in most such circumstances textual material can
be sorted into discrete categories for greater ease in assessment. In any event, depositions
pose a decidedly smaller burden even in complex cases.
[Vol. 39:157
ACCESS TO DEPOSITIONS
standards for suppression hearings. ° The Lewis court included
guidelines 1 for trial judges to use when applying the test: the pre-
sumption is that a pretrial hearing should be open, and the movant
has the burden of proving by a greater weight of the evidence that
closure is necessary. If closure is ordered, the transcript of the
hearing must be made available to news media at a specified future
time. Findings of fact and conclusions of law must be made pursu-
ant to a closure request for later review, if required.
Even before the Supreme Court of Florida enlarged its pre-
sumption of openness in Lewis, two district courts of appeal relied
on supreme court opinions that preceded Lewis to conclude that
trial courts may not summarily deny media access to depositions.
In Sentinel Star Co. v. Booth,'9 2 the Second District Court of Ap-
peal remanded a trial court's closure order because the trial court
had sealed, before trial, all defense depositions without hearing ob-
jections by the media and without setting forth the basis for clo-
sure. According to the Booth court the authority to reverse trial
court closure orders must be cautiously exercised in accordance
with the test the Fourth District Court of Appeal adopted in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. State,93 a test that appeared sub-
sequently in expanded form in Lewis. The Booth court stated that
the standard to be met before first amendment freedoms can be
abridged is that press access must constitute "'an immediate, not
merely likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger
must not be remote or even probable, it must immediately
imperil.'""
The Fifth District Court of Appeal similarly remanded in
Ocala Star Banner Corp. v. Sturgis,95 concluding that "[w]hat our
Supreme Court said in [McIntosh regarding prior restraint] is ap-
plicable here [regarding the sealing of depositions]."96 The district
90. See, e.g., Kansas City Star Co. v. Fossey, 230 Kan. 240, 630 P.2d 1176 (1981); Lex-
ington Herald Leader Co. v. Tackett, 601 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1980); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v.
Recorder's Court Judge, 409 Mich. 364, 294 N.W.2d 827 (1980); State v. Hannah, 171 N.J.
Super. 325, 408 A.2d 1349 (App. Div. 1979); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d
318, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980); Rapid City Journal Co. v. Circuit Court, 286 N.W.2d
125 (S.D. 1979); Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982) (en
banc); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 1979).
91. Lewis, 476 So. 2d at 8-9.
92. 372 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
93. 363 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
94. Booth, 372 So. 2d at 102 (quoting State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 908 (Fla. 1977)).
95. 388 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
96. Id. at 1369.
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court said that trial courts need to have uniform standards against
which judicial discretion may be measured, "so that to the extent
possible, similar situations will produce similar results. '97 The
court then proceeded to embrace the three-pronged closure test.
In Sturgis, the Fifth District Court of Appeal saw the limita-
tion of media access, like prior restraint orders, as a form of cen-
sorship because the media cannot print information that it is una-
ble to gather. Acknowledging a distinction between the two types
of orders, the Sturgis court called it "a distinction without a differ-
ence. Under either order, the information is kept from the public
and censorship results. Under these circumstances, we see no rea-
son to adopt a different type of test in access cases."98
Relying heavily on these appellate results, many Florida trial
courts 9 in recent years declared a qualified right of public access
to depositions. In Florida v. Tolmie,100 for example, the court re-
cited the public policy announced in Lewis and held that "all pre-
trial depositions are presumptively open to the press and public
and shall not be closed . . . until such time as any party seeking
such closure . . . [has made] an appropriate evidentiary show-
ing."101 Statements taken from a party in the case, the court noted,
qualified as depositions and not investigative statements, and are
therefore part of judicial proceedings. A different judge in the
same court held similarly in State v. Sanchez that "the press has
the right, although not an 'absolute right,' to attend depositions
even if they be considered something other than 'judicial proceed-
ings.' " 0 At issue were an estimated seventy to eighty depositions
97. Id. at 1371.
98. Id.; cf. News-Press Publishing Co. v. State, 345 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
(trial court's statement that it had cogent reasons for sealing depositions fell short of re-
quired specificity of reasons for denying public access); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Collazo, 329 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (reversed the sealing of the terms of settlement
in a civil case because no sound reason for sealing provided by trial court). But cf. Tallahas-
see Democrat Inc. v. Willis, 370 So. 2d 867, 871-72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) ("[Wle perceive a
distinction between press rights of access to court hearings or trials, and access to portions
of the court file or records which may or may not be subject to public and press inspection,
i.e. specifically, depositions.").
99. Circuit court opinions in Florida, particularly in procedural matters, are not re-
ported uniformly. One litigant has complained that "the Media Law Reporter does not reli-
ably report circuit court orders on [the deposition] issue and only catalogs [those] which
were favorable to the media." Response to Emergency Petition for Review at 7, Palm Beach
Newspapers v. Burk, No. 83-422 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
100. 9 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1407 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 1983).
101. Id. at 1408.
102. 1 Fla. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (15th Cir. Ct. 1981). The judge explained that he included
depositions within judicial proceedings. Id.
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to be taken; the court ruled that the defendants had not satisfied
the three-part closure test.10 3 In a civil case, Cazarez v. Church of
Scientology,104 the movant for closure failed to meet the three-part
requirement. Consequently, the court opened pretrial depositions
to the press and the public. "[T]he mere desire for privacy," ac-
cording to the court, "is not sufficient to satisfy the standard." ' 5
State v. Diggs'°6 concerned a defendant in the highly visible trial
resulting from the death in Miami of black motorcyclist Arthur
McDuffie. The judge, denying a blanket closure of pretrial deposi-
tions to the public, said that specific depositions might be shielded
if the movant proved a legally sufficient basis.10 7 In State v.
Bundy,10 8 a case which spawned great public interest nationwide,
the trial judge applied the closure test when the defendant sought
to have depositions taken privately and found that "clear and co-
gent" evidence supporting closure had not been provided.109
Several trial courts have denied access to nonparties. In State
v. Hagler,l1 ° the court cited a criminal procedure rule,"' which
prescribed the duties and prerogatives of the parties, and inferred
from the rule that the taking and transcribing of depositions is re-
served only to parties: "The rule does not confer rights upon the
103. Florida judges in small towns such as Chattahoochee and Monticello fre-
quently are faced with trials of defendants with whom literally everyone in town
is intimately familiar. Through appropriate trial management techniques, judges
in these communities are able to guarantee defendants their right to fair
trial .... [T]here is no reason to conclude that a fair trial cannot be held in a
large metropolitan area such as West Palm Beach merely because the newspa-
pers report facts learned about the case in pretrial depositions.
Id. at 119.
104. 6 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 2109 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 1980).
105. Id. (citing News-Press Publishing Co. v. State, 345 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)).
106. 5 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 2596 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1980).
107. Id. at 2597. The potential for prejudicial pretrial publicity was not enough to draw
a curtain on the taking of depositions. The judge did elect, however, to change the venue
from Miami to Tampa.
108, 48 Fla. Supp. 204 (2d Cir. Ct. 1979). For other trial court rulings favoring non-
party access to depositions, see Withlacoochee River Elec. Coop. v. Seminole Elec. Coop., 1
Fla. Supp. 2d 137 (13th Cir. Ct. 1982); State v. Hodges, 7 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 2424 (Fla.
20th Cir. Ct. 1981); Johnson v. Broward County, 7 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 2125 (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct. 1981); Herndon Ambulance Serv. v. Collier County, 50 Fla. Supp. 85 (20th Cir. Ct. 1980);
State v. Alford, 49 Fla. Supp. 208 (15th Cir. Ct. 1979).
109. 48 Fla. Supp. at 206.
110. State v. Hagler, No. 82-3750-CF-A02 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Sept. 12, 1983) (order de-
nying motion to release deposition transcript).
111. Id. at 2. "The party taking the deposition shall give written notice to each other
party .... Any deposition taken pursuant hereto may be used by any party... FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.220(d).
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general public or its alter-ego, the press." '112 Another trial court in
the same circuit denied the media's request to attend depositions
or have access to transcripts in a murder case, Florida v. Aurilio,"1
3
insisting that depositions are not judicial proceedings and that
nonparties have no right of access. 1 4
Other than in Florida, cases dealing with nonparty access to
depositions are scarce beyond the last decade, especially in the
states. One enterprising federal district court reached back to the
Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided that a deposition after taking
shall "be by him the said magistrate sealed up and directed to such
court, and remain under his seal until opened in court. " 1 5 By con-
trast, one of the leading modern treatises on procedure observes
that "[o]utside the area of trade secrets, research, etc., the contem-
plation is that discovery proceedings are public proceedings and
there is a heavy burden placed on a party seeking protection
against disclosure."" 6 In another recently-published treatise, the
authors surveyed the field and found that with respect to being
present during a deposition and having access to discovery infor-
mation, "courts have generally declared that discovery proceedings
must take place in public and become part of the public record,
unless some compelling reason exists for denying public access to
the proceedings."'
Whether or not a qualified constitutional right exists for pub-
lic access-an issue not resolved by Rhinehart or other Supreme
Court opinions-there is clearly no constitutional prohibition of
access as long as courts can provide fair trials. Florida's courts,
from lowest to highest, have developed a common law basis for ac-
commodating those interests in a variety of pretrial settings.
Nonparty access to depositions flows naturally along still an-
other legal conduit: the Florida rules.
112. State v. Hagler, No. 82-3750-CF-A02 at 3 (order denying motion to release deposi-
tion transcript).
113. No. 82-5858-CF-T (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 1983).
114. The rulings in Hagler and Aurilio are pending on appeal in the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, styled respectively Miami Herald & Palm Beach Newspapers v. Harper, &
Palm Beach Newspapers v. Burk. For other trial court rulings denying nonparty access, see
Times v. Bryson, 411 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); State v. Dudley, No. 81-2247 (Fla. 6th
Cir. Ct. 1981).
115. Times Newspapers Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F. Supp. 189, 195 (C.D.
Cal. 1974).
116. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 188 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 26.75 n.3 (1977-78 Supp.)).
117. R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE 61 (1982) (footnote omitted).
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C. Rules of Procedure
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are devoid of any pre-
sumptive restriction on the presence of members of the public at
the taking of depositions or on public access to transcripts of depo-
sitions. The public's growing participation in the deposition pro-
cess in Florida in recent years reflects the heightened public inter-
est in judicial matters and contrasts with an earlier era when
public concern with judicial affairs was less visible and less in-
formed. As a result, the rules governing depositions with respect to
nonparty involvement, have been neutral. The cloistered character
of deposition-taking has been a custom and not a requisite, serving
the convenience of counsel and, as purported by counsel, the needs
of parties in the absence of any asserted public interest in the pro-
cess itself.
The Florida rules, with strong parallels to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, repose considerable discretion in the trial judge to
"make any order to protect a party or person from annoyance, em-
barrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense that justice
requires""' in deposing of parties and witnesses, including specific
power to designate persons who may be present during discov-
ery. 1 9 Although the judge's discretionary authority is broad
enough to provide protection and confidentiality when those con-
siderations legitimately outweigh a need for disclosure, trial courts
have not been unwilling to issue such orders.'20 The rules specifi-
cally provide that confidential commercial information may be
shielded entirely or disclosed only in a designated manner.''
After a deposition is taken and filed with the court, the rules
require that the public have access to those depositions."' A sepa-
rate rule minimizes the access in actual practice, however, by for-
bidding the filing of depositions with the court unless the contents
118. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c).
119. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c)(5).
120. See, e.g., Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
(association not required to produce records of ethics committee); In re Jolderma v. Stew-
art, 370 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (husband's nurse could not be deposed in marriage
dissolution proceeding); Rose Printing Co. v. D'Amato, 338 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
(income tax returns of defendant's wife need not be disclosed); Widener v. Croft, 184 So. 2d
444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (deposition could not include inquiry into witness' grand jury testi-
mony). Only a tiny percentage of protective orders, of course, are appealed.
121. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c)(7).
122. "Unless otherwise ordered by the court, (1) any deposition may be opened and
examined by any person under the supervision of the clerk or (2) the clerk may unseal the
deposition and file it with the other papers in the court file." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.400.
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''must be considered by the court on any matter pending before
the court." 23 A well-intentioned move to ease the storage burden
in courthouses thus allows an attorney, by design or by inaction, to
withhold from public view a transcript in his file or a deposition
not yet transcribed from a stenotypist's notes (a transcript need
not be created except for filing with the court).24
The rule encompassing discovery in Florida criminal caseS12 5 is
tailored to the needs inherent in a prosecutor-defendant relation-
ship. The rule neither authorizes nor prohibits public attendance
at depositions. With specified exceptions, the rule simply states
that "the procedure for taking such deposition[s] . . . shall be the
same as that provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.'
126
Formalizing a qualified and presumptive doctrine of public ac-
cess to depositions would require only modest changes in the rules.
When a transcript exists, a nonparty who desires a copy would pay
reasonable costs of duplication. When transcribing has not been
accomplished, an inquiring member of the public would pay the
standard cost of preparation. Accommodation of nonparties during
the taking of depositions may be the most awkward aspect to trial
counsel accustomed to fast and convenient arrangements. The
rules presently allow great flexibility in choice of location and tim-
ing, except for persons confined in prison. Nonparties with an in-
terest in particular depositions, may express their interest in writ-
ing to counsel for the parties, and may therefore receive reasonable
notice concerning the scheduling of depositions. The rulemaking
process would be expected to refine such modifications to minimize
disruption and delay.
The Florida rules have evolved to meet emerging realities. For
example, an amendment in 1976 authorized the taking of deposi-
tions on video tape.'27 Pursuant to a 1980 change, any person (pre-
viously limited to a party) can now examine a deposition in the
clerk's office unless the court orders otherwise.'28 A routine updat-
ing of the rules is scheduled on a quadrennial basis, with the next
cycle to start in 1987. Urgent proposals, however, can be taken to
the Supreme Court of Florida at any time. 21
123. FLA. R. Cjv. P. 1.310(f)(3).
124. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(f).
125. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220.
126. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d).
127. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(4).
128. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.400(1).
129. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.130(c), (e), (f).
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ACCESS TO DEPOSITIONS
Judge Wilkey of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals provides a useful perspective on discovery in the context of
the federal rules, which served as the pattern for those now used in
Florida:
Congress could have adopted discovery laws that completely
prohibited the extra-judicial use and dissemination of discovery
materials . . . At the other extreme, Congress could have
adopted discovery laws that mandated the public dissemination
of discovery materials . . . . Congress . . . adopted the middle
course. There are no explicit restrictions on extra-judicial use of
discovery materials, but a court has the discretionary power and
responsibility to impose such restrictions where [circumstances
require]. '
The Florida rules, in effect, have adopted that middle ground.
As indicated, minor changes could make that course explicit.
III. CONCLUSION
"'Tut, tut, my child!' said the Duchess to Alice.
'Everything's got a moral, if only you can find it.'""
The Supreme Court of Washington is concerned by "the cloud
which will be cast upon the integrity of the discovery process if the
courts permit such [public] intrusions." '132 A commentator worries
that "[t]he cases articulating a broad public right of access . . . [to
discovery] threaten to undermine it."' 3
Such reasoning tends to be flawed in two important respects.
The first is a preoccupation with absolutes. The options, as Judge
Wilkey noted, are three: a total prohibition of public access, com-
pletely unlimited public access, or something in the middle.
Neither law nor policy supports the two extremes. Strong doctrinal
and policy reasons exist, however, for a presumption of public ac-
cess to depositions, with a burden on the party seeking closure to
rebut the presumption favoring public access.
The second is a preoccupation with the "integrity"of discovery
to the detriment of the integrity of the judicial process itself. It is
beyond challenge that public confidence in judicial process is very
low indeed, and the social consequences potentially are quite dan-
130. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 208 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
131. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 111 (Collier ed. 1962)
(paraphrased).
132. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 254, 654 P.2d 673, 689 (1983).
133. Marcus, supra note 33, at 73.
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gerous. We have seen that a huge percentage of transactions within
the judicial system pass virtually unnoticed and unexamined, with
no reasonable certainty among ordinary citizens that justice
prevails, and with cynical doubts among a great many.
Public access to pretrial procedures, and especially to deposi-
tions, is a fresh issue, emerging not from voyeuristic curiosity but
from a deep and moral interest in the integrity of government.
Case precedents are few, but the principles involved are not new.
The need for informed citizens to have confidence in their govern-
ment is paramount.
NORMAN DAVIS
